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Notes
"Come One, Come All,
but Watch Your Back!"
Missouri Sides with Business Owners in
Negligent Security Action
Hudson v. RiverportPerformanceArts Centre'

I. INTRODUCTION
The thought of being attacked and injured by an unknown person is
frightening. In a concert setting, it is comforting to know that paying high prices
to see one's favorite act also purchases a security force charged with maintaining
order and providing safety. Security, however, cannot prevent every incident of
unruliness. When such incidents occur, courts are often left to decide who
should bear the burden of making things right.
Courts long have recognized that common carriers and innkeepers owe a
duty to protect theirpassengers and guests.2 In the 1970s, however, states began
to impose such a duty on the owners of other kinds of real property.' Now,
plaintiffs are bringing suits against the owners of apartment complexes,4
shopping malls,5 hospitals,6 grocery stores,7 schools,' and other businesses.'
Given the current rise in the amounts ofjury awards, it is little wonder that such
actions are becoming more common across the country."

1. 37 S.W.3d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
2. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & BARBARA B. MCFARLAND, THE LAW OF PREMISES
LiABiLrrY § 11.2, at 330-31 (3d ed. 2001).
3. Id.

4. See Kline v. 1500 Mass. Ave. Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477,478-80 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
5.
6.
7.
1997).
8.
9.

See Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Kan. 1993).
See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 695 P.2d 653, 662 (Cal. 1985).
See Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1019 (N.J.
See Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 333-34 (Mass. 1983).
See Hardee v. Cunningham & Smith, Inc., 679 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. Dist. Ct.

App. 1996).
10. Steven C. Minson, A Duty Not to Become a Victim: Assessing the Plaintiff's
Fault in NegligentSecurity Actions, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 611, 614 (2000).
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In terms of sheer volume, premises-liability cases form one of the largest
subcategories within the broad spectrum of tort law." Courts are dealing with
this influx of lawsuits in a variety of ways. Some courts act as gatekeepers,
devising rigid tests to ensure only the most deserving cases get to ajury.' 2 Other
courts are more lenient, adopting flexible tests that allow more cases to reach
juries. 3 Which approach is better is the subject of much debate. This Note will
discuss Missouri's law governing negligent security actions, its application in
Hudson v. Riverport PerformanceArts Centre, 4 its policy ramifications, and
competing theories.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On July 26, 1996, David and Susan Hudson filed suit to recover for injuries
and loss of consortium resulting from an assault on David by an unknown third
party.'" The assault occurred at Riverport Amphitheater in St. Charles, Missouri,
during a Lynyrd Skynyrd and Doobie Brothers concert.' 6 Hudson named
Riverport Performance Arts Centre ("Riverport") 7 and BMW Entertainment
Services, Inc., ("BMW") as defendants. 8
On the night in question, a "long-haired gentleman" struck David Hudson
("Hudson") in the face with a whiskey bottle after an argument over a blanket. 9
Hudson testified that, a few minutes before the assault, he and the "long-haired
gentleman" had exchanged words.2" The "long-haired gentleman" proceeded to
walk away, and Hudson "just assumed it was over."21 However, the "longhaired gentleman" approached Hudson again and struck Hudson with the
bottle.' The "long-haired gentleman" immediately faded into the crowd.'
Hudson's friends quickly escorted him to medical treatment, while Susan

11. WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supranote 2, § 1.1, at 1.
12. WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supranote 2, § 1.1, at 1.
13. WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supranote 2, § 1.1, at 1.
14. 37 S.W.3d 261 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
15. See id. at 263.
16. Id.
17. Id. "Riverport" includes Riverport Performance Arts Centre, Joint Venture,
Contemporary Investment Corp., Sverdrup/MDRC Joint Venture, McDonnell Douglas
Realty Co., and Contemporary Productions, Inc. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/9
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Hudson went to find security personnel. 4
At the time of this incident, Riverport was party to a contract with BMW
under which BMW was responsible for providing security for the concert.' On
the night in question, BMW employed ninety security personnel, fourteen of
whom were monitoring the lawn area where David and Susan Hudson sat.26
Susan Hudson testified that two or three security personnel were standing about
twenty feet from them but were unaware of the assault until she ran to them for
help.27 BMW placed additional security personnel at the entrance of the
amphitheater to conduct pat-down searches, and to check bags and blankets.'
Bottles were not allowed on the premises of the amphitheater and were
immediately confiscated if found.29

Hudson argued that Riverport and BMW were liable for the injuries he
suffered because they assumed a duty to protect him while attending the
concert." Hudson claimed this duty arose out of the "special facts and
circumstances" exception to the general rule that there is no duty to protect a
business invitee from the criminal acts of unknown third persons.31 Hudson
further argued that Riverport and BMW were put on notice that such "special
facts and circumstances" existed based on evidence of fifty-five other assaults
that occurred at Riverport between 1992 and 1996.32
BMW filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Hudson failed to offer
evidence that BMW fell within a recognized exception to the general rule that
there is no duty to protect business invitees from the criminal acts of unknown
third persons. 33 Riverport subsequently adopted the motion. 34 Thus, the trial
court treated it as ajoint motion for summary judgment.3' The trial court granted
the motion for summary judgment, stating that Hudson failed to prove he was
owed a duty of protection.36

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.

29. Id.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 265.
Id. at 263.
Id.

35. Id.
36. Id. The night before the summary judgment hearing, Hudson filed a motion

for leave to file a third amendment to the petition. Id. Hudson sought to add a claim that
"the search conducted by the Defendants was negligent in failing to discover a glass
bottle of alcohol on the perpetrators that engaged in a fight at the performance on the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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On appeal, Hudson argued that the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment because he introduced sufficient facts to establish that Riverport and
BMW had assumed a duty to protect him and were negligent by failing to
provide adequate security to prevent attacks by third persons.37 The Missouri
Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected Hudson's
argument and held that an injured invitee may not recover in negligence against
a premises owner for the criminal acts of an unknown third person absent
sufficiently numerous or similar prior acts of violence. 8

I1. LEGAL BACKGROUND
It is a general principle of negligence law that a private person has no duty
to protect another from criminal attack by a third person, absent a contrary
statute or some special relationship or circumstance.39 Similarly, early case law
on this subject refused to hold premises owners liable for harm inflicted upon
their invitees as a result of the criminal acts of third persons.' In 1965, however,
the Restatement (Second)ofTorts recognized the general duty owed by business
owners to their guests to provide reasonable protection from foreseeable criminal
assaults.41

Defendant Riverport's premises, by which Plaintiff,David Hudson, was struck, resulting
in the injuries he sustained." Id. The trial court denied Hudson's proposed amendment,
finding that it lacked merit and appeared to be put forth to avoid summary judgment. Id.
at 263-64. Hudson raised the denial of this amendment on appeal. Id. at 264. This issue,
however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 265.
39. 57A AM. JUR. 2D. Negligence § 104 (1989 & Supp. 2001).
40. William Edward Taylor & Joseph M. Taylor, A Plaintiff'sApproach to the
PreparationofPremises Liability Cases Basedon the CriminalActs of Third Persons,
53 J. Mo. B. 98, 99 (1997).
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 (1965). Section 344 states:
A possessor of land who holds it open to the public for entry for his business
purposes is subject to liability to members of the public while they are upon
the land for such a purpose, for physical harm caused by the accidental,
negligent, or intentionally harmful acts of third persons or animals, and by the
failure of the possessor to exercise reasonable care to (a) discover that such
acts are being done or are likely to be done, or (b) give a warning adequate to
enable the visitors to avoid the harm, or otherwise to protect them against it.
Id. In addition, comment f to Section 344 suggests that:
[a business owner] may, however, know or have reason to know, from past
experience, that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons
in general which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor, even though he
has no reason to expect it on the part of any particular individual.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/9
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Since the publication ofthe Restatement (Second)ofTorts and its expansion
of the duty owed by business owners, states have struggled with whether to
impose this duty and, if so, how to define its scope."2 All states now recognize
that business owners owe, under circumstances that vary from state to state, a
duty to protect customers from the criminal acts of third persons.43 Recent case
law, however, suggests that the scope of the duty and the proper test for
measuring it are still unsettled issues."
In Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout,Inc.,' 5 the Missouri Supreme
Court held that while there was no general duty to protect invitees from the
criminal acts of third persons occurring on the premises, under certain
circumstances, a duty would exist.' Missouri has adopted two well-recognized
exceptions to the general rule of non-liability.47 The first is based on the
connection, or relationship, between the plaintiff and defendant (the "special
relationship exception"), while the second is based on other factors that make the
criminal act foreseeable (the "special facts and circumstances exception").4'
Some states, however, have adopted a more expansive approach to liability
based on a wide variety of factors (the "totality of the circumstances").49
A. Special RelationshipException
The "special relationship exception" applies when "a party entrusts himself
to the protection of another and relies upon that person to provide a place of
safety.... Historically, special relationships have been limited to relationships
such as those of common carrier-passenger, school-student, innkeeper-guest,
and, sometimes, employer-employee."5 The key rationale for labeling these
relationships as special relationships is that the victim has placed himself or

Id. § 344 cmt. f.
42. Minson, supranote 10, at 616-18.
43. ALANKAMINSKYA COMPLETEGUIDETOPREMISESSECURITYL1TIGATION 109-

78 (1995) (providing a state-by-state summary of leading negligent security cases and
noting a very limited duty in Alabama and Michigan); WEISSENBERGER&MCFARLAND,
supra note 2, § 11.3, at 331-32 (noting that support for the broad, no-duty rule is
"virtually non-existent").
44. Minson, supranote 10, at 618.
45. 758 S.W.2d 59 (Mo. 1988).
46. Id. at 61-62.
47. William M. Corrigan, Jr. & Timothy W. VanRonzelen, Liabilityfor Criminal

Mo. B. 359, 359-60 (1996).
Acts of Third Persons,52 J.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 361.
50. Groce v. Kan. City Spirit, Inc., 925 S.W.2d 880, 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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herself under the control and protection of the other party with the consequent
loss of ability to protect himself or herself."
The element of control, itself, however, does not usually characterize the
relationship between business possessors and entrants. 2 Therefore, a general
invitor-invitee relationship does not create a special relationship under this
exception. 3 In cases that involve a special relationship, the relationship alone
creates the duty.54 Thus, prior criminal acts that would establish foreseeability

are not necessary to establish the existence of this duty.5 For this situation,
Missouri courts have established the "special facts and circumstances"
56
exception.
B. Special Facts and CircumstancesException
The "special facts and circumstances exception" represents two theories of
liability proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The first involves
injuries inflicted by persons with known dangerous proclivities ("known third
person"). 5' The second involves frequent and recent occurrences of violent
crimes against persons on the premises ("prior violent crimes").59

1. Known Third Person
The most straightforward and conservative theory of a business owner's
liability for the criminal acts of third persons against invitees is the "known third
person" theory.60 Under this theory, when a property owner knows or has reason
to know of a particular person's dangerous or threatening tendencies yet takes
no action to prevent a violent act, a duty arises as a direct function ofthe owner's
knowledge." Proof of prior violent crimes is not required under this test."2

51.

WEISSENBERGER

&MCFARLAND, supra note 2, § 11.2, at 330 (citing Michael

J. Bazyler, The Duty to ProvideAdequateProtection:Landowners 'LiabilityforFailure
to Protect Patronsfrom CriminalAttack, 21 ARiz. L. REv. 727, 736 (1979)).
52. WEISSENBERGER & MCFARLAND, supranote 2, § 11.2, at 330.
53. Meadows v. Friedman R.R. Salvage Warehouse, 655 S.W.2d 718, 721 (Mo.

Ct. App. 1983).
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
Corrigan & VanRonzelen, supra note 47, at 360.
See infra notes 57-86.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Taylor & Taylor, supra note 40, at 101.
Corrigan & VanRonzelen, supra note 47, at 360.
Taylor & Taylor, supra note 40, at 101.
Taylor & Taylor, supra note 40, at 101.

62. Taylor & Taylor, supranote 40, at 101.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/9
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Liability under this theory may be found only if there is sufficient time in which
the owner could have acted to mitigate the threat.6 3 Courts have found that the
display of firearms or weapons, language that is loud or threatening, or any other
physical acts that are threatening in nature indicate a person is behaving in a
threatening manner."
In Missouri, plaintiffs may recover under this theory, but they are not
limited to it.'5 Some states, however, have limited the duty of a business owner
to the "known third person" theory.66 This approach is essentially the one
adopted by Section 344 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.67 Few states,
however, maintain it as the sole remedy for recovery against a business owner.6 8

2. Prior Violent Crimes
The most common theory ofrecovery against a business owner for criminal
acts by a third person is the "prior violent crimes" exception. 9 Under this

63. Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270,273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
64. Claybom v. Midwest Petroleum Co., 819 S.W.2d 742, 746 (Mo. Ct. App.
1991).
65. See Brown v. Van Noy, 879 S.W.2d 667, 670, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (The
plaintiff was injured when a man struck him in the face while he was at the defendant's
bar. The bar owner knew the man who assaulted the plaintiff and knew the man had a
history of fighting. The court held that there was enough evidence to submit the case to
the jury, stating that, "[w]hen a tavern owner permits a person to remain in his tavern,
knowing him to manifest vicious tendencies likely to inflict injury upon others, the tavern
owner has a duty to act to protect his patrons."); see also Nappier v. Kincade, 666
S.W.2d 858, 861-62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (The court provided a very good description
of the "known third person" rule.).
66. See, e.g., Henley v. Pizitz Realty Corp., 456 So. 2d 272,277 (Ala. 1984) (The
plaintiff's abduction from a parking garage and subsequent rape was not the result ofthe
defendant's negligent failure to provide security, despite prior instances of serious crime
on the premises, because no evidence suggested that the defendant knew or had reason
to know ofimminent bodily harm to the plaintiff.); Shipes v. Piggly Wiggly St. Andrews,
Inc., 238 S.E.2d 167, 169 (S.C. 1977) (The defendant store was not liable for an assault
on the plaintiff in the parking lot because employees had no knowledge the attack was
occurring or was about to occur.); Bums v. Johnson, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Va. 1995)
(The gas station was not liable for the abduction and rape of the customer, who left her
car at the pump for more than one hour just after a drunk male customer tried to gain
entry to the locked store by uttering a lewd suggestion to the female attendant because
the evidence "utterly" failed to show that the attendant knew a criminal assault was about
to occur.).
67. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
68. See Minson, supra note 10, at 619 & n.48.
69. Corrigan & VanRonzelen, supra note 47, at 360.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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theory, third-party crimes against invitees are foreseeable only if the plaintiffcan
establish that the defendant knew or should have known of prior similar crimes
on to the premises.7" Missouri courts have adopted the "prior violent crimes"
theory, noting that three elements must be proved." First, the necessary
relationship must exist between the plaintiff and the defendant, which
encourages the plaintiff to come onto the premises (i.e., invitor-invitee or
landlord-tenant).72 Second, "there must be prior specific incidents of violent
crimes on the premises that are sufficiently numerous and recent to put a
defendant on notice, either actual or constructive, that there is a likelihood third
persons will endanger the safety of defendant's invitees." 73 Third, the incident
that caused the injury must be "sufficiently similar in type to the prior specific
incidents occurring on the premises that a reasonable person would take
precautions to protect his or her invitees against that type of activity."74
In Missouri, the "prior violent crimes" theory is narrowly defined. For
example, a plaintiff simply cannot allege that the defendant's location is in a
"high-crime" area or has been the target of excessive criminal conduct.75 The
plaintiff must prove a sufficient amount of like criminal conduct such that the
landowner is put on notice that a repeat incident might occur.76 Accordingly, in
Brown v. NationalSupermarkets, Inc.,77 the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Eastern District of Missouri found that evidence of sixteen robberies involving
a firearm, seven incidents of strong-arm robberies, and 136 other reported crimes
were sufficient to establish "special facts and circumstances" under the "prior
violent crimes" theory, making an assault and battery with a gun foreseeable.78
On the other hand, in Brown v. Schnuck Markets, Inc.,79 the Missouri Court of
Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri found for the defendant store owner
because the plaintiff, who was assaulted in a parking lot, failed to produce
evidence of prior similar incidents of violent crimes on the premises that were
"'sufficiently numerous and recent to put a defendant on notice' that parking lot
assault was foreseeable." 80

70. Minson, supra note 10, at 619.
71. Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270,273-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
72. Id. at 272.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 274; see also Groce v. Kan. City Spirit, Inc., 925 S.W.2d 880, 885 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1996).
75. Groce, 925 S.W.2d at 885.
76. Id.
77. 679 S.W.2d 307 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
78. Id. at 308-09.
79. 973 S.W.2d 530 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
80. Id. at 533 (The only prior crimes introduced were a non-violent purse snatching
and one robbery.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/9
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In addition, not all incidents of prior criminal activity are relevant. The
nature of the criminal act resulting in the injury and those criminal acts that
occurred in the past must share "common elements."'" For example, if the
incident that caused injury occurred outside of a business establishment (i.e., the
parking lot), then it is necessary to exclude prior incidents that occurred inside
the business.8" Furthermore, prior incidents occurring near a business, but not
on the actual premises, are excluded. 3
The "prior similar incidents" theory has been administered in a variety of
ways. Some jurisdictions, such as Missouri, impose the narrow view that the
defendant's knowledge must derive from prior criminal attacks of the same or
a substantially similar type previously committed on the defendant's premises.'
Other jurisdictions adopt the broader view that the duty may arise from the
defendant's knowledge of prior criminal acts committed in the general area of
the defendant's premises, which suggest the possibility of violence in the
future. 5 Regardless ofthe interpretation of this test, many ofthese jurisdictions,
including Missouri, have experienced difficulties in administering the test
consistently. 6

81. Keesee v. Freeman, 772 S.W.2d 663, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989).
82. See Bowman v. McDonald's Corp., 916 S.W.2d 270,278,281 (Mo. Ct. App.
1995); Pickle v. Denny's Rest., Inc., 763 S.W.2d 678, 681-82 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
83. Faheen v. City Parking Corp., 734 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
84. See Mills v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 482 S.E.2d 449, 450 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(narrowly interpreting the "prior similar incidents" -rule by affirming that no liability
existed when the shopper was injured by a fleeing shoplifter because the plaintiff failed
to present any evidence of prior incidents in which a patron was injured by a fleeing
thief); Lauersdorfv. Supermarket Gen. Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (App. Div. 1997)
(finding property crimes gave no notice that the rape of the plaintiff was foreseeable).
85. See Sturbridge Partners, Ltd. v. Walker, 482 S.E.2d 339, 341 (Ga. 1997)
(holding that a landlord's knowledge ofseveral prior burglaries mightbe enough to prove
that the rape of a tenant was foreseeable); Marshall v. David's Food Store, 515 N.E.2d
134, 136 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that fourteen instances of prior criminal activity
within two blocks of the parking lot where the plaintiff was raped showed sufficient
evidence of the crime's foreseeability), appeal denied, 522 N.E.2d 1246 (Ill. 1988);
Murrow v. Daniels, 364 S.E.2d 392,398 (N.C. 1988) (making it ajury question whether
the rape and robbery of a motel guest was foreseeable when the evidence showed that the
motel was located in a high-crime area where similar incidents had occurred); Polk v.
Rhinestone Wrangler, 774 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. App. 1989) (holding that evidence that
fights broke out at the bar sixty percent of the time and that patrons had drawn guns on
two or three occasions created a duty on the part of the bar owner to protect patrons from
assault by other patrons).
86. Minson, supranote 10, at 620.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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C. Totality of the Circumstances
Several jurisdictions have adopted a more expansive theory known as the
"totality of the circumstances" approach." At least in part as a reaction to the
shortcomings of the "prior similar incidents" approach, the "totality of the
circumstances" approach allows a factfinder greater latitude in determining when
criminal acts of third persons are sufficiently foreseeable.88 Under this test, the
ordinary rules of negligence apply, meaning that foreseeability is a question of
fact and turns on all of the evidence, not just prior crimes similar to the one that
injured the plaintiff.89 Thus, violent incidents that occur near the premises might
be sufficient to put the defendant on notice that the crime could occur on his or
her property." In addition, a business also might foresee criminal attacks in a
poorly lit parking garage, even though none have occurred there before."
Under this approach, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of foreseeability
that normally would not be allowed in a "prior similar incidents" jurisdiction.'
This evidence may include the architectural design of the landowner's
premises;93 any security measures the landowner has taken, such as cameras or

87. See Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 695 P.2d 653, 659-60 (Cal. 1985)
(holding that foreseeability should not be determined by the "rigid application of a
mechanical 'prior similars' rule" but, rather, by the totality of the circumstances, which
included the location ofthe property in a high-crime area, criminal assaults on or near the
premises, and poor lighting in the parking lot where the assault occurred); cf Ann M. v.
Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 213-15 (Cal. 1993) (revisiting the "totality of
the circumstances" rule and announcing new factors); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders,
Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1339-40 (Kan. 1993) (adopting the "totality of circumstances"
approach when the plaintiff was shot in an underground parking garage and no evidence
was offered of prior similar crimes in the parking garage); Clohesy v. Food Circus
Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1027 (N.J. 1997) (rejecting the "prior similar
incidents" rule in favor of the "totality of circumstances" rule); Reitz v. May Co. Dep't
Stores, 583 N.E.2d 1071, 1074 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (adopting the "totality of
circumstances" test, which allowed consideration of evidence ofprior nonviolent crimes
when the plaintiffwas stabbed in a parking lot); Torres v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 670 P.2d 230,
235-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (describing the "totality of circumstances" test without
labeling it).
88. Minson, supranote 10, at 619-20.
89. See generally Minson, supra note 10.
90. See Isaaes,695 P.2d at 659-61; cf Ann M, 863 P.2d at 213-15 (concluding that
prior similar incidents of violent crime compliments the "high degree of foreseeability"
requirement).
91. See Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194,201 (S.D. 1989).
92. Minson, supra note 10, at 620.
93. See Clohesy v. Food Circus Supermarkets, Inc., 694 A.2d 1017, 1019 (N.J.
1997) (reversing the trial court's grant of the defendant's motion for summaryjudgment
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss1/9
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guards;' lighting;9 the character ofthe business;96 the character ofneighborhood
businesses;97 and all prior crimes, violent and nonviolent, on or near the
premises.98 As a result, courts that use the "totality of the circumstances" test
significantly expand the range of circumstances that could constitute sufficient
notice to a landowner of the need to take measures to protect his or her patrons.99
Under the "totality of the circumstances" approach, evidence of prior
similar crimes is still an important factor in determining foreseeability. As the
California Supreme Court noted, "the requisite degree of foreseeability rarely,
if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar incidents of violent crime
on the landowner's premises."'0 0 The Kansas Supreme Court, however, adopted
the approach stating that it "[was a] better reasoned basis [than the 'prior similar
incidents' rule] for determining foreseeability."' 1 The Missouri Supreme Court
has acknowledged that "[t]he touchstone for the creation of a duty is
foreseeability."'' 2 However, Missouri has not adopted the "totality of the
circumstances" approach.0 3

and citing evidence, including that the store permitted parking in an area impossible to
observe from inside the store, as sufficient to present the jury the question of the store's
negligence).
94. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 662 (noting evidence of an insufficient number of
guards and cameras).
95. See Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1340 (Kan. 1993)
(remanding to determine what role insufficient lighting played in a shooting).
96. See Isaacs, 695 P.2d at 661 (noting hospital emergency rooms, surrounding
areas, and nearby parking lots had high potential for violent acts).
97. See Clohesy, 694 A.2d at 1021 (noting evidence that a neighboring gas station
and liquor store, which were gathering places for loiterers, should have alerted the
grocery store to the need for parking lot security).
98. See id. (noting evidence of all prior crimes on or near the store's premises for
the preceding two-and-one-half years, including shoplifting and driving while
intoxicated, and noting the increasing number of offenses).
99. Minson, supra note 10, at 620.
100. Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).
101. Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1340 (Kan. 1993).
102. Madden v. C &K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758 S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. 1988).
103. Corrigan &VanRonzelen, supranote 47, at 361. A compelling case can be
made that the Missouri Supreme Court at least suggested use of the "totality of the
circumstances" test in Virginia D. v. Madesco Investment Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881, 887

(Mo. 1983). "If VirginiaD. was ambiguous in its suggestion that Missouri should adopt
a totality of the circumstances approach, no Missouri case after VirginiaD. specifically
refutes the merit of the doctrine." Taylor & Taylor, supranote 40, at 102.
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INSTANT DECISION

In Hudson, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of
Missouri held that an invitee could not recover in a negligence action against a
premises owner for criminal acts of an unknown third person absent sufficiently
numerous or similar prior crimes of the type inflicted on the invitee.'4 The court
began by reciting the general rule that there is no duty to protect a business
invitee from criminal acts of unknown third persons. 5 Next, the court noted
that a duty may be imposed by common law if there is a "special relationship"
or if "special facts and circumstances" exist. 6 After briefly discussing the
"special relationship" exception, the court noted that, because Hudson did not
allege that a "special relationship" existed between him and Riverport and
BMW, the issue would not be addressed. 7
The court next discussed the "special facts and circumstances" exception,
which was the basis of Hudson's claim. 8 The court began by noting that the
"special facts and circumstances" exception can apply in two situations.'" First,
"when a person, who is known to be violent, or behaves in such a manner as to
indicate danger, is on the premises and a sufficient time exists to prevent the
injury" (i.e., the "known third person" theory)."0 The second situation occurs
"when a relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant that
encourages the plaintiff to enter the premises" (i.e., the "prior violent crimes"
l
theory).'

The court stated that, in the second situation, the plaintiffmust show "prior
specific incidents of violent crimes have occurred on the premises that are
sufficiently numerous and recent to put a defendant on notice, either actual or

constructive, that there is a likelihood third persons will endanger the safety of
defendant's invitee."' 2 Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiff also must
show that the situation surrounding the injury is "sufficiently similar in type to
the prior specific incidents occurring on the premises that a reasonable person

104. Hudson v. Riverport Performance Arts Ctr., 37 S.W.3d 261, 265 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2000).
105. Id. at 264.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 265.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 264.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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would take precautions to protect his or her invitees against that type of
activity."

113

Having recited the law, the court stated that Hudson failed to produce
sufficient evidence to bring the case within the "known third person" theory of
the "special facts and circumstances" exception. First, the court stated that
Hudson failed to show that Riverport or BMW had any knowledge that the
"long-haired" gentleman who assaulted Hudson was violent or, prior to the
incident, acted in a manner indicating danger." 4 The court noted that, in fact,
Hudson indicated just the opposite in his deposition." 5 In his deposition,
Hudson stated that "not only was there not sufficient time to put Riverport and
BMW on notice of the 'long-haired' gentleman's violent propensities, but there
was insufficient time for the security personnel standing twenty feet away to
prevent the attack."'" The court then concluded that, because of these facts,
Hudson failed to establish that this case falls within the "known third person"
theory of the "special facts and circumstances" exception." 7
Next, the court addressed the "prior violent crimes" theory of the "special
facts and circumstances" exception. Hudson argued that, as a ticket holder, he
was encouraged to come to the amphitheater, and that Riverport and BMW were
put on notice by sufficiently similar and numerous prior acts ofviolence.' ' The
court acknowledged Hudson's introduction of fifty-five police reports between

113. Id. at 265.
114. Id.
115. Id. In his deposition, Hudson testified that:
two or three minutes before the assault, he and the "long-haired" gentleman
had exchanged some words. The long-haired gentleman then walked away,
and Mr. Hudson "just assumed it was over." Further, Mr. Hudson testified he
was not even sure if anyone in his group noticed this exchange, and
personally, he did not feel the need to inform the security personnel. When
the "long-haired" gentleman approached Mr. Hudson the second time, Mr.
Hudson testified "just a few seconds" had lapsed between the time he
approached Mr. Hudson and struck him.
Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2002], Art. 9
MISSOURI LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 67

1992 and 1996.' 9 The court, however, distinguished these prior incidents. 2 °
The court reasoned that:
[a]fter excluding all of the incidents that occurred outside of [the]
Amphitheater, there is evidence that thirty-eight assaults occurred at
Riverport within a five-year span.... Out of these assaults, most
appeared to be fistfights, elbowing, pushing, kicking, and pulling2 hair;
none of these assaults involved a bottle or other similar object.1 '
The court then stated that "[t]hese assaults [were] not sufficiently similar
in nature to the incident in this case or numerous to put Riverport or BMW on
notice. '' " Therefore, the court concluded that Hudson "failed altogether to
establish this case falls within the 'special facts and circumstances' exception."''
As a result, the court held that Hudson could not recover in a negligence action
against Riverport and BMW because the prior assaults failed to reach the
24
standard of "sufficiently numerous or similar."'
V. COMMENT

In Hudson, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of
Missouri cut off a potential legal disaster for the owners of theaters, sports teams,
stadiums, restaurants, and other public places by ruling that a patron who was
assaulted by an unknown third person could not recover from the premises
owner for lack of security. In so doing, the court upheld the traditional approach
for determining foreseeability, the "prior violent crimes" analysis of the "special
2
facts and circumstances" exception to the general rule of no liability. 1

119. Id.
120. Id. According to the court:
Out of fifty-five police reports, fifty-two of them were documented assaults.

Only fourteen of the assaults actually occurred on the lawn area, the same
location appellants were located; twenty-four occurred in other areas inside the
premises of Riverport; and, fourteen occurred in the parking lot. Of the fiftytwo assaults, only one involved a glass bottle, and it occurred in the parking

lot.
Id.
121. Id.

122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id.
125. Id.
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states
However, the court failed to discuss the alternative theory that several
26
approach.
circumstances"
the
of
"totality
the
adopted,
recently have
The ruling in Hudson is in line with Missouri precedent. The "prior violent
crimes" analysis of the "special facts and circumstances" exception has been
applied by the Missouri Supreme Court since Madden. 7 However, while
Missouri courts have yet to adopt the "totality of the circumstances" approach,
they have not rejected it explicitly. 2 1 While the plaintiffs in Hudson did not
attempt to argue for a change in Missouri law, such an argument has merit and
plausibly could be considered in future cases.
Under the "totality of the circumstances" approach, the facts in Hudson
might have produced a different result. First, in using the "prior violent crimes"
analysis, the court excluded several assaults that occurred outside of Riverport
Amphitheater, including an assault involving a glass bottle that occurred in the
parking lot. 9 Under the "totality of the circumstances" approach, these
incidents would be considered in determining if the assault on Hudson was
foreseeable. Furthermore, using the "prior violent crimes" approach, the court
distinguished assaults involving the use of fists, elbows, and hair pulling from
assaults by bottle throwing. 3 ' In a "totality of the circumstances" jurisdiction,
this distinction is not dispositive. Rather, the number of assaults, regardless of
the type, occurring on or near the premises would be considered in determining
foreseeability.
A proponent of the "prior violent crimes" approach may argue that, in
practice, these two competing approaches will yield the same result. For
example, when arguing under the "prior violent crimes" approach, a court will
look at all prior crimes offered into evidence and "weed out" those that do not
fit under the exception. Using the evidence that fits, the court then will
determine if there is enough to establish foreseeability. Under the "totality of the
circumstances" approach, if prior crimes are the only evidence offered, as in
Hudson, a court likely will give less weight to those crimes that ordinarily would
be outside the "prior violent crimes" exception. If a court gives less weight to
the crimes that are not as "similar or numerous," the end result could be the
same.
The "prior violent crimes" approach limits a court's analysis to those
specific prior crimes that fit the exception.' 3' Under the "totality of the
126. For a discussion ofthe "totality ofthe circumstances" test, see supranotes 87103 and accompanying text.
127. See supranotes 45-46 and accompanying text.
128. See supranote 103 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
131. For a discussion of the "prior similar incidents" rule, see supra notes 69-86
and accompanying text.
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circumstances" approach, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of all prior crimes,
violent and nonviolent, on or near the premises.132 More importantly, a plaintiff
also may introduce a wide variety of other evidence that might be helpful in
determining foreseeability but would be excluded under the "prior violent
crimes" approach.'
Essentially, the "totality of the circumstances" approach expands the scope
of a premises owner's duty. Courts that use this approach broaden the range of
circumstances that could constitute sufficient notice to alert an owner of the need
to take precautions to protect his or her invitees.'34 The practical result is that
rhore cases will reach the jury under the "totality of the circumstances" approach
than do under the current Missouri-adopted "prior violent crimes" approach.
Whether this result is preferable to the result reached under the "prior
violent crimes" approach is open to debate. One commentator has suggested that
the "totality of the circumstances" approach is "pro-plaintiff' and that it marks
the "culmination of the transition from a strict to a broad interpretation of
foreseeability."' 3 Likewise, courts have criticized the approach for providing
a broad standard for imposing liability and for coming close to imposing strict
liability on business owners for any criminal attacks suffered by patrons while
on the premises. 3 6 It is argued that such a rule would violate the widely-held
view that business owners are not the insurers of their customers' safety. 37
Arguments against the "prior violent crimes" approach, however, are also
numerous. Commentators have criticized the "prior violent crimes" approach
because it gives the premises owner at least one "free" injury. 38 Essentially, the
first crime never will subject the premises owner to liability because, by
definition, there are no prior violent crimes to establish foreseeability.

132. For a discussion ofthe "totality of the circumstances" test, see supranotes 87103 and accompanying text.
133. For a discussion ofthe "totality of the circumstances" test, see supranotes 87103 and accompanying text.
134. For a discussion ofthe"totality ofthe circumstances" test, see supranotes 87103 and accompanying text.
135. Donna Lee Welch, Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center: The California
Supreme Court Retreatsfrom Its 'Totality of the Circumstances'Approachto Premises
Liability,28 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1061-62 (1994).
136. McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P'ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 900 (Tenn. 1996)
(noting with approval criticism toward the "totality of circumstances" test because it
"effectively impos[es] an unqualified duty to protect customers in areas experiencing any
significant level of criminal activity").
137. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965) (providing that
"the possessor is not the insurer of the visitor's safety").
138. Minson, supra note 10, at 619.
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In addition, commentators also have argued that the "prior violent crimes"
approach removes too many cases from the jury and that it generates "arbitrary
decisions about what kinds of prior crimes are sufficiently similar to establish
foreseeability."' 39 These arbitrary decisions inevitably result in an inconsistent
application of the law.
Economic considerations are at the forefront of this debate. For example,
in 1995, the average jury award in negligent security actions involving rape was
$1.8 million.'" With more than four-thousand rapes reported in parking garages
and lots in 1995, it is clear that this theory of liability subjects business owners
to excessive liability.' 4' Under the "prior violent crimes" approach, this vast
liability is potentially cut off.42 A likely result is lower costs for business
owners due, in part, to lower insurance premiums. Ideally, these lower costs will
be passed on to consumers, who will benefit through lower prices. Meanwhile,
the injured party is left with no recovery. Under the "totality of the
circumstances" approach, business owners are vulnerable to large, unpredictable
jury verdicts. 43 While the injured party may prefer this result, the consumer
likely will be stuck with the tab.
The decision in Hudson does nothing to change existing law in Missouri.
However, by maintaining the "prior violent crimes" approach as law, Missouri
courts continue their policy of siding with business owners in negligent security
actions.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Hudson, the court upheld the traditional standard for dealing with a
business owner's liability for the criminal acts of unknown third persons inflicted
upon his or her patrons. In so doing, the court maintained a policy ofsiding with
business owners in negligent security actions. However, an argument for a
change in Missouri law that is more consumer friendly is, by no means, dead and
has merit. Whether Missouri courts will acknowledge and eventually accept this
argument is for future jurists to decide.
MATTHEW J. LANDWEHR

139. Minson, supra note 10, at 619.
140. KAMINSKY, supra note 43, at 4.
141. KAMINSKY, supra note 43, at 4.
142. For a discussion of the "prior similar incidents" rule, see supranotes 69-86
and accompanying text.
143. For a discussion ofthe "totality of the circumstances" test, see supranotes 87103 and accompanying text.
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